We develop a New Keynesian small open economy model to compare the welfare performances of two classes of monetary policy rules: exchange rate rules and interest rate rules. The expected lifetime utility of the representative household is used as the welfare criterion. The model is solved using second-order approximation methods. We …nd that under benchmark parameterization, an exchange rate rule delivers lower standard deviations of GDP and in ‡ation compared to an interest rate rule, when the economy has a high degree of openness. However, despite that, an exchange rate rule is welfare inferior to an interest rate rule since it delivers lower mean terms of trade, which leads to lower mean consumption and higher mean labor hours. On the other hand, when the elasticity of substitution for export is high, an exchange rate rule is welfare superior to an interest rate rule, regardless of the degree of openness, as the di¤erences in mean terms of trade for the two classes of rules become smaller.
Introduction
Ever since the seminal contribution of Taylor (1993) , monetary policy discussions have been dominated by "interest rate rules", a class of monetary policy rules where interest rates react endogenously to a small set of macroeconomic variables. An important reason for the success of the Taylor-style interest rate rules is that Taylor (1993) and many subsequent contributions have demonstrated that this class of rules seems to describe the actual monetary policies of many central banks in advanced countries rather well. 1 Another reason for their popularity is that they are simple, easy to understand and implement. As a result, many studies have been devoted to study both the positive and normative implications of interest rate rules.
Despite the popularity of interest rate rules, there are some alternative monetary policy rules that might be worth studying. 2 One such alternative is "exchange rate rules", de…ned
here to be a class of monetary policy rules where nominal exchange rates react endogenously to a small set of macroeconomic variables. One reason why exchange rate rules deserve some attention is that Parrado (2004) and McCallum (2006 McCallum ( , 2007 aptly that its monetary policy deserves attention because Singapore has more population and a larger GDP in dollar term than New Zealand, which is a pioneer in "world-wide surge toward in ‡ation targeting". Parrado (2004) also observes that Singapore's monetary policy "has helped achieve a track record of low in ‡ation with prolonged economic growth".
Moreover, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, McCallum (2006 McCallum ( , 2007 shows that for a very open economy like Singapore, an exchange rate rule can deliver a much lower volatility of output gap, compared to an interest rate rule, with only slightly higher volatility of in ‡ation.
The goal of this paper is to compare the welfare implications of exchange rate rules and of openness is high, so that imported goods as a share of gross output is high. The lower volatility of in ‡ation also means that an exchange rate rule leads to a lower mean resource cost of price dispersion.
Despite the lower mean resource cost of price dispersion, we …nd that an exchange rate rule is welfare inferior to an interest rate rule under the benchmark parameterization, regardless of the degree of openness. The result hinges on the e¤ects of the mean terms of trade. Since an interest rate rule delivers a higher standard deviation of nominal exchange rate, it also leads to a more favorable average terms of trade as exporters set a higher price to cushion for nominal exchange rate uncertainty. The more favorable terms of trade leads to a higher mean consumption and lower mean labor hours for an interest rate rule, and hence higher welfare compared to an exchange rate rule.
In spite of the results above, we …nd that an exchange rate rule can be welfare superior to an interest rate rule for alternative parameterization of the model. Speci…cally, when the elasticity of substitution for export is high but within the range for empirical estimates, an exchange rate rule can beat an interest rate rule regardless of the degree of openness.
This is because when the elasticity of substitution for export is high, exchange rate rules and interest rate rules di¤er less in terms of the average level of terms of trade, leaving the welfare di¤erence to be dominated by the mean resource cost of price dispersion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. We present the model in Section 2. The welfare measure is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the calibration and solution methods. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The model that we construct builds on the contribution of McCallum (2006 McCallum ( , 2007 and Kollmann (2002 
The representative household
There is a representative household in the small open economy. The representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility, which is de…ned over consumption, C t , and labor hours, 4 In contrast, McCallum (2006 McCallum ( , 2007 does not have capital accumulation in his model. 5 However, the qualitative results of this paper will not change if the alternative speci…cation is adopted. The results are available upon request. 6 While incomplete exchange rate pass-through can have important implications for welfare comparisons of monetary policy regimes (e.g. Devereux and Engel, 2003; Corsetti and Pesenti, 2005) , we will leave the case of incomplete pass through for future research. L t . Period utility function is speci…ed as separable in consumption and labor hours:
where E t is the expectations operator conditional on time t information; 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, 0 is the inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity, and > 0 is a preference parameter.
The representative household owns the capital stock, K t , in the small open economy. The capital stock evolves according to the law of motion:
where I t is the gross investment. 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of the capital.
In addition to choosing consumption, labor hours, capital stock and investment, the representative household also holds a risk-free domestically traded domestic currency denominated bond, A t+1 and a risk-free internationally traded foreign currency denominated bond, B t+1 . The budget constraint for the representative household is:
where e t is the nominal exchange rate, expressed as the number of unit of domestic currency required to purchase one unit of foreign currency. P t is a price index for the domestic …nal goods, to be de…ned formally below. Following Kollmann (2002) , we assume that the interest rate at which the domestic representative household can borrow or lend foreign currency fund, R f t , is subjected to a "spread" from the foreign nominal interest rate, R t . The "spread" is assumed to be a decreasing function of the net foreign asset position of the domestic economy:
where P 
Equation (6) equates the marginal disutility and marginal bene…t of labor hours. Equa-tion (7) is the domestic bond's Euler equation. Equation (8) (7) and (8) imply, E t ê t+1 =R t R f t ' t , where e t e t =e t 1 and a hat on a variable denote log deviation of that variable from its steady state. The term ' t , can be interpreted as an uncovered interest parity (UIP) shock, which is designed to capture deviations from the UIP condition. Equation (9) is the capital Euler equation.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive domestic intermediate goods …rms,
The production function for an intermediate goods …rm i is:
where Y i;t is the output of …rm i, K i;t and L i;t denote the capital stock and labor hours used by …rm i, respectively. t is an exogenous economy-wide technology process.
is the domestic value added in the production. Q m i;t is the amount of imported goods used as input by …rm i. 2 (0; 1) is a parameter that determines the share of domestic value added in the production. # > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between domestic value added and imported goods in the production. The parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the share of rental income in domestic value added.
Firm i chooses K i;t , L i;t and Q m i;t by solving a cost minimization problem:
s.t.
where P m t is the price of the imported goods in domestic currency term. The …rst order conditions are:
where M C t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (12), which can also be interpreted as the nominal marginal cost. 7 Following the literature, we assume that the intermediate goods are aggregated into composite …nal domestic goods, Y t , via the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
where v is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of intermediate goods.
Cost minimization leads to the following demand function for Y i;t :
where P i;t is the price of Y i;t while P t is a price index for Y t given by:
7 Given the structure of the model, nominal marginal cost will be equalized across …rms, so there is no subscript i on M C t .
The composite …nal domestic goods is demanded as consumption and investment goods in the domestic market as well as exported:
where Q 
where > 0 is the elasticity of substitution for export; > 0 is a scaling factor. We assume that price adjustment for the intermediate goods …rms is staggered à la Calvo (1983) . Each period, each intermediate goods …rm i faces a random probability of (1 ),
, of resetting its price, P i;t . If P i;t is not reset, it is updated by the steady state in ‡ation rate, , according to the rule P i;t = P i;t 1 . LetP i;t denote the new price that is reset in period t. After resetting the price at period t, there is probability that the price has not been reset at period t+ , and hence P i;t+ = P t . Using the demand function, (17) , and the price updating rule, the optimization problem for …rm i in the domestic market is:
; where t;t+
is a discount factor for evaluating pro…t streams, T C( ) is the total cost as a function of the demand. The …rst order condition for the optimization problem is:
Market clearing and aggregation
Market clearing for the labor, capital and imported goods markets requires the supplies, L t , K t and Q m t , equal the sum of demand from all domestic intermediate goods …rms:
Since the domestic bonds, A t , is assumed to be traded only domestically, its net supply is zero in equilibrium:
De…ning (17) can be aggregated across …rms as:
where For ease of discussion below, it is useful to de…ne here the constant price real GDP as:
where p m is the steady state value of the ratio of import price to domestic …nal goods price.
In the equation above, the price of domestic goods P has been normalized to 1 in the base year, while the price of import have been set to its steady state value in the base year. It is also useful to de…ne the terms of trade, S t , as the ratio of export price to import price:
Note that since we assume full pass through, we have e t P x t = P t and P m t = e t P t , so the terms of trade also equals the inverse of real exchange rate in this paper. 8 
The government
We assume that the consolidated government conducts monetary policy using either a Taylor (1993)-type interest rate rule or an exchange rate rule. For the case of interest rate rule, the policy rule is of the form:
where , GDP are policy parameters while t P t =P t 1 is the gross domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation rate. 9 For the case of exchange rate rule, the policy rule is of the form:
where e t e t =e t 1 is the gross rate of nominal depreciation. Negative signs are put in front of and GDP for the exchange rate rule so that positive values of and GDP correspond to counter-cyclical policies.
Since the optimal values of and GDP for the interest rate rule and exchange rate rule to the public. In the search for the optimal policy coe¢ cients, we also impose a condition that the monetary policy rule must yield a locally unique rational expectations equilibrium. It is worthwhile to note that for the case of the exchange rate rule, = GDP = 0 corresponds to a …xed exchange rate regime.
Exogenous processes
Following Kollmann (2002), we assume that the productivity, foreign in ‡ation, foreign interest rate and the UIP shocks follow exogenous …rst-order autoregressive processes:
where t P t =P t 1 is the gross foreign in ‡ation rate. " t , " t , " 
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006b, 2007), we compute the expected lifetime utility conditional on the initial state being the deterministic steady state. This ensures that the economy always starts from the same initial point, since for a given set of parameter values, the steady states of this model are the same for all monetary policy rules considered in this paper.
Following Lucas (1987) , we report the welfare as the fraction, 
Higher values of c correspond to lower welfare.
Solution method and calibration
The model is solved numerically by taking second order Taylor The model is calibrated with time unit being one quarter. , the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, is set to 2, as is commonly assumed in the literature. The subjective discount factor, , is set at 0.99, so that the steady state annual real interest rate is 4%. , the inverse of Frisch labor elasticity, is set to 1, following Christiano et al. (2005) .
Following McCallum (2005 McCallum ( , 2006 McCallum ( , 2007 , the elasticity of substitution between domestic value added and imported input, #, is set to 0.6. We also follow McCallum in setting the elasticity of substitution for export, , to 0.6 in the benchmark, but we will investigate the robustness of results for alternative values of . The parameter a a¤ects the steady state ratio of imports to GDP and we will consider two cases in this paper. In case 1, we set a so that the steady state ratio of imports to GDP is 60%, which matches the …gure for Singapore (McCallum 2006 (McCallum , 2007 . We will call that case a "high-openness" economy. In case 2, we set a so that the steady state ratio of imports to GDP is 15%, which matches the …gure for a "typical" industrial economy (McCallum, 2006 (McCallum, , 2007 . We will call that case a "low-openness" economy. Given the value of #, a is set to 0.58 for the high-openness economy and 0.855 for the low-openness economy. The share of capital income in value added, , is set to 0.3, as is commonly assumed in the literature. The elasticity of substitution across di¤erent variety of goods, v, is set to 6, following McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Kollmann (2002) .
The scale factor for export demand, , in equation (20), is set to 0.391 and 0.103 for the high-openness economy and low-openness economy, respectively, so that there is balanced trade in the steady state. The preference parameter, , is set to 12.376 and 13.413 for the high-openness economy and low-openness economy, respectively, so that the representative household spends 30% of its time working in the steady state.
We set the depreciation rate of capital, , to 0.025, as is commonly assumed in the literature. We set the capital adjustment cost parameter, , to 15, so that the standard deviation of investment is about 2 to 3 times the standard deviation of GDP. Following Kollmann (2002) , the fractions of …rms not setting the prices optimally in each period, is set to 0.75, so that the average price change duration is one year. The steady state gross in ‡ation rate, , is set to 1, as is commonly assumed in the literature. 10 The extent of …nancial integration, , in equation (5), is set to 0.0019, following Kollmann (2002) .
Finally, for the exogenous shock processes, we use the same calibration as Kollmann ( Table 1 about here) 10 Since we assume there is full indexation to steady state in ‡ation rate when prices are not reset, the results will be robust to the steady state in ‡ation rate. Recently, Ascari (2004) argues that the dynamics of a model might be a¤ected by the steady state in ‡ation rate if there is partial or no indexation to the in ‡ation rate. We do not consider partial or no indexation in this paper and leave that for future research.
Results
We report the simulation results in this section. First, we will discuss the results under the benchmark parameterization. We will show that the terms of trade play an important role in the results. Next, we will explore the robustness of the results to alternative parameterization of the model. Table 2 shows the results for the benchmark model. There are several interesting results. , we also …nd that the optimized exchange rate rule delivers a lower (2.00%) standard deviation of domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation ( t ) compared to the optimized interest rate rule (2.86%), when the degree of openness is high. 12 However, when the degree of openness is low, the optimized exchange rate rule leads to a higher (2.54%) standard deviation of domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation compared to the optimized interest rate rule (0.87%).
Benchmark results
( Table 2 about nominal exchange rate for the optimized exchange rate rule restricts the ability of nominal exchange rate to stabilize GDP through expenditure switching e¤ects. On the other hand, the lower standard deviation of nominal depreciation leads to a lower standard deviation of import price in ‡ation for the optimized exchange rate rule since there is full exchange rate pass through into the import price. Since the imported goods are inputs in the production process, the import price in ‡ation can be thought of as a supply shock. Hence, the lower standard deviation of import price in ‡ation tends to lead to lower standard deviations of domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation and GDP. When the degree of openness is high (so that imported input as a share of gross output is high), the pass-through e¤ect dominates, which leads to lower standard deviations of GDP and domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation for the optimized exchange rate rule. When the degree of openness is low, the shock absorber role of nominal exchange rate dominates, so the standard deviations of GDP and domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation for the optimized exchange rate rule is higher, compared to the optimized interest rate rule.
For the high openness economy, the lower standard deviation of domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation ( t ) leads to a lower mean resource cost of price dispersion (u t ), for the optimized exchange rate rule (0.09% versus 0.18% for the optimized interest rate rule). However, surprisingly, despite the lower mean resource cost of price dispersion, the optimized exchange rate rule leads to much higher welfare cost compared to the optimized interest rate rule. The welfare cost of the optimized exchange rate rule is 0.34% of steady state consumption while it is -0.31% for the optimized interest rate rule. The welfare di¤erence of 0.65% of steady state consumption is large in the realm of business cycle analysis. 13 The better performance of the optimized interest rate rule seems to stem from the terms of trade e¤ect. The expected value 14 of terms of trade, S t , for the optimized interest rate rule (3.24%) is higher than that of the optimized exchange rate rule (1.28%). The more favorable terms of trade for the optimized interest rate rule stems from its higher volatility of nominal depreciation. A higher volatility of nominal depreciation leads to a more favorable terms of trade since it induces exporters to set higher export price to compensate for the exchange rate uncertainty. The more favorable terms of trade for the optimized interest rate rule in turn allows the representative household to consume more and work less, compared to the optimized exchange rate rule. 15 Hence, the optimized interest rate rule delivers higher mean consumption (2.01%), lower mean labor hours (-1.33%) and hence lower welfare cost (-0.31%), compared to the optimized exchange rate rule (0.97%, -0.54% and 0.34%, respectively).
For the low openness economy, in addition to the lower expected value of terms of trade, the optimized exchange rate rule leads to a higher mean resource cost of price dispersion, since 13 For comparison, the classic estimate of welfare cost of business cycle in Lucas (1987) is 0.17% for a coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , of 20, while = 2 in our model.
14 Expected value of a variable is reported in terms of log deviation from its steady state value in this paper.
15 Using a simpler model for which imported goods are not inputs into the production of intermediate goods but combine with a composite domestic goods to form a constant elasticity of substitution composite …nal goods, Sutherland (2006) show that the mean terms of trade can increase or decrease the welfare depending on the parameter values. However, the model in this paper cannot be directly compared with Sutherland (2006) since the production structure is di¤erent. it leads to a higher standard deviation of domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation as mentioned above. The less favorable terms of trade and the higher mean resource cost of price dispersion both lead to a higher welfare cost for the optimized exchange rate rule.
High elasticity of substitution for export
The subsection above has shown that under the benchmark model, an optimized exchange rate rule is welfare inferior to an optimized interest rate rule, regardless of the degrees of openness. This is true even though the optimized exchange rate rule delivers lower standard deviations of GDP and domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation for the high openness economy.
The reason is that an optimized exchange rate rule delivers lower volatility of nominal depreciation and hence less favorable mean terms of trade, compared to an optimized interest rate rule. Since the terms of trade e¤ect plays an important role in the results, it is natural to ask whether the results will continue to hold for alternative parameterization of the model, for which the terms of trade e¤ect might play a smaller role.
A parameter that is important for the magnitude of the terms of trade e¤ect is the elasticity of substitution for export, . When the elasticity of substitution for export is high, exporters might be less willing to charge a higher export price to cushion for the exchange rate uncertainties since the demand is more sensitive to the price. This would make the terms of trade e¤ect to vary less with exchange rate volatility. In the subsection above, the elasticity of substitution for export, , is set to 0. Table 3 shows the results for the case of = 10. Similar to the results in Table 2, for the high openness economy, the optimized exchange rate rule delivers lower standard deviations of GDP and domestic goods price in ‡ation, compared to the optimized interest rate rule. Therefore, the optimized exchange rate rule leads to a lower mean resource cost of price dispersion. However, unlike the results in Table 2 , for the high openness economy, the optimized exchange rate rule entails a lower welfare cost compared to the optimized interest rate rule when = 10. The intuition for this result can be found in Table 3 . When = 10, while the optimized interest rate still delivers a higher mean terms of trade (0.25% vs. 0.11% for the optimized exchange rate rule), the di¤erence in the mean terms of trade is much smaller compared to the benchmark results for which = 0:6 (3.24% vs. 1.28%
for the optimized interest rate rule and the optimized exchange rate rule, respectively). As mentioned above, the reason behind this pattern is that when the elasticity of substitution for export is high, exporters will be less willing to charge a higher price to cushion for the exchange rate volatility and hence the mean terms of trade will vary less with exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the welfare di¤erence between the optimized exchange rate rule and the optimized interest rate rule depends mostly on the mean resource cost of price dispersion.
Since the optimized exchange rate rule leads to a lower (0.03%) mean resource cost of price dispersion compared to the optimized interest rate rule (0.20%), the optimized exchange rate rule is welfare superior to the optimized interest rate rule.
( Table 3 about here) Interestingly, unlike the results in Table 2 , when = 10, the optimized exchange rate rule is also welfare superior to the optimized interest rate rule for the low openness economy. Like the case of high openness, the di¤erence in mean terms of trade is smaller for the case of low openness when = 10. In addition, the optimized exchange rate also delivers lower standard deviations of GDP and domestic goods price in ‡ation for the case of low openness, when = 10. This is because when the elastcity of substitution for export is high, export demand is sensitive to the export price, so exporters will try to make their export prices more stable, leading to more stable export demand. A more stable export demand in turn leads to more stable domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation and GDP through the linkages between export demand, GDP, and factor prices. The lower standard deviation of domestic …nal goods price in ‡ation leads to a lower mean resource cost of price dispersion for the optimized exchange rate rule. The lower resource cost of price dispersion translates into a smaller welfare cost for the optimized exchange rate rule.
( Figure 1 about here) In order to investigate further the robustness of the results for di¤erent values of , we plot the welfare costs for the exchange rate rules and interest rate rules, for between 0.6 to 20 in Figure 1 . For both types of monetary policy rules, we …x at 3 and GDP at 0 for all values of . As can be seen from the …gure, for the case of high openness, the exchange rate rule is welfare superior to the interest rate rule for > 2. For the case of the low openness, the exchange rate rule is welfare superior to the interest rate rule for > 7.
These values are within the range of the empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution.
Hence, the results in this paper suggest that high degree of openness by itself does not make an exchange rate rule to be welfare superior to an interest rate rule, when the expected utility of the representative household is used as the welfare criterion. In contrast, for high elasticity of substitution for export, an exchange rate rule can be welfare superior to an interest rate rule, regardless of the degrees of openness. It is also worthwhile to note that the welfare costs of interest rate rules increase very rapidly as elasticity of substitution for export increases, especially for the case of high openness, while the welfare costs of exchange rate rules change by less as elasticity of substitution for export changes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the welfare performances of exchange rate rules with interest rate rules. We develop a New Keynesian small open economy DSGE model for the analysis. We depart from the existing studies on exchange rate rules by using the expected lifetime utility of the representative household as the welfare criterion. We …nd that while an exchange rate rule delivers lower standard deviations of GDP and in ‡ation compared to an interest rate rule when the degree of openness is high, an exchange rate rule is welfare inferior to an interest rate rule under benchmark parameterization. This is because an exchange rate rule delivers lower mean terms of trade, which leads to lower mean consumption and higher mean labor hours. However, for high elasticity of substitution for export, an exchange rate rule is welfare superior to an interest rate rule, regardless of the degree of openness, as the di¤erences in mean terms of trade for the two classes of rules become smaller.
The results in this paper suggest that elasticity of substitution for export, which can be thought of as the degree of competition in the export market, is more important than the degree of openness in deciding the welfare ranking between exchange rate rules and interest rate rules. They also suggest that an exchange rate rule can be a better monetary policy rule than an interest rate rule for a country that faces intense competition in the export market, which should be relevant for most emerging economies.
We conclude this paper by discussing the directions for future research. First, the paper can be extended to allow for incomplete pass-through of exchange rate. Studies such as Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) have shown that incomplete pass-through can alter the welfare ranking of monetary policy regimes. Second, the paper can be extended to incorporate "balance sheet e¤ects". Elekdag and Tchakarov (2007), for example, have shown that balance sheet e¤ects associated with liability dollarization can make it bene…cial for emerging markets to stabilize the exchange rate. Notes: (1) The interest rates rules are given by ln (R t =R) = ln ( t = )+ GDP ln(GDP t =GDP ) while the exchange rate rules are given by ln ( e t = e) = ln ( t = ) GDP ln(GDP t =GDP ). Notes: (1) The interest rates rules are given by ln (R t =R) = ln ( t = )+ GDP ln(GDP t =GDP ) while the exchange rate rules are given by ln ( e t = e) = ln ( t = ) GDP ln(GDP t =GDP ). 
